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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(1) (1986):
(1) "Person" includes any individual
firm, copartnership, joint adventure,
corporation, estate, or trust, or any group
or combination acting as a unit and the
plural as well as the singular number unless
the intention to give a more limited meaning
is disclosed by the context.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-5(4) (1986):
(4) Each vendor shall, on or before
the last day of the month next succeeding
each calendar quarterly period, file with
the commission a return for the preceding
quarterly period. The return shall be
accompanied by a remittance of the amount of
tax required under this chapter to be
collected by the vendor for the period
covered by the return.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9) (1992):
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be
interpreted to restrict a presiding officer,
for good cause shown, from lengthening or
shortening any time period prescribed in
this chapter, except those time periods
established for judicial review.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 (1988):
(1)(a) Within 20 days after the date that
an order is issued for which review by the
agency or by a superior agency under Section
63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if the order
would otherwise constitute final agency
action, any party may file a written request
for reconsideration with the agency, stating
the specific grounds upon which relief is
requested.
(b) Unless otherwise provided by
statute, filing of the request [for
reconsideration] is not a prerequisite for
seeking judicial review of an order.
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(3)(a) The agency head, or a person
designated for that purpose, shall issue a
written order granting the request or
denying the request.
(b) If the agency head or the person
designated for the purpose does not issue an
order within 20 days after the filing of the
request, the request for reconsideration
shall be considered to be denied.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1988):
(3)(a) A party shall file a petition for
judicial review of final agency action
within 30 days after the date that the order
constituting the final agency action is
issued or is considered to have been issued
under Subsection 63-46b-13(b).
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STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On September 28, 1990, Petitioners received

certain Statutory Notice from the Auditing Division of the State
Tax Commission indicating tax deficiencies for audit periods
ranging from October 1, 1985 to September 30, 1988.
2.

(R. 685-96)

Each of the four Petitioners received a separate

notice and tax assessment with Harper Excavating, Inc. having
the most significant tax liability of $696,543.41.
3.

(R. 685-96)

On October 26, 1990, Richard C. Skeen filed a

Petition for Redetermination with the Tax Commission.
Nelson assisted Mr. Skeen with the petition.
4.

Thomas E.

(R. 669)

Prior to the formal hearing before the Tax

Commission, Richard C. Skeen and Robert A. Peterson were
identified as the primary attorneys for Petitioners on virtually
all of the documentation filed by Petitioners with the
Commission.
5.

(R. 215-696)
Richard C. Skeen and Robert A. Peterson were the

attorneys who tried Petitioners' claims before the Tax
Commission in the formal hearing on July 30, 1991.
6.

(R. 207)

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Tax

Commission took the matter under advisement.

(Transcript at

152)
7.

On January 9, 1992, the Tax Commission issued its

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision.
207)

-1IQ?\-VW; 1

(R.

8.

According to the mailing certificate attached to

the Final Decision, the decision was mailed to Petitioners as
follows:
Harper Investment, Inc.
c/o Thomas E. Nelson
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, UT

84144

Though the decision affected each of Petitioners individually
and differently, the mailing certificate named only one of the
four Petitioners to the action and did not identify Harper
Excavating, Inc., the petitioner with the greatest tax
liability.

Moreover, the mailing certificate was not sent to

Richard C. Skeen or Robert A. Peterson, the primary attorneys to
the action.
se.

In fact, no notice was sent to Van Cott, Bagley per

The notice was allegedly sent in care of Van Cott, Bagley

to one of the four Petitioners.
9.

(R. 214)

Despite the assertion made in the mailing

certificate, none of the Petitioners or their counsel received a
copy of the Final Decision until February 20, 1992, forty-two
(42) days after the decision was issued.
10.

(R. 64-67, 181-206)

On February 20, 1992, the taxing authorities

arrived at Petitioners' place of business, delivered a copy of
the Final Decision to Petitioners, and attempted to collect the
judgment of nearly one million dollars.

This was the first

notice that Petitioners or their counsel received of the
decision.

Petitioners immediately notified their counsel of the

decision.

(R. 64-67)
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11.

On February 24, 1992, Petitioners filed a motion

with the Tax Commission requesting the Commission to extend the
time for filing a notice of appeal.

Petitioners relied upon the

fact that they did not receive notice of the Final Decision
until after the date for filing a petition had passed.
Petitioners' relied upon Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(e)
in their motion.
12.

(R. 165)

Petitioners filed seven affidavits in support of

their motion to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal
including the affidavits of Robert A. Peterson, Richard C.
Skeen, Thomas E. Nelson, Robert W. Payne Kerry L. Warr, Paul L.
Miles and Steven Karsten.

These are the only individuals who

would have seen a copy of the Final Decision allegedly mailed by
the Tax Commission.

The affidavits carefully traced Van Cott,

Bagley's mail distribution procedures with respect to Tom Nelson
after he left the firm.

Each of the affiants signed the

affidavits under oath stating that they never saw a copy of the
Final Decision of the Tax Commission until on or after February
20, 1992.

(R. 64-67, 181-206)
13.

In its memorandum in opposition to Petitioners'

motion, Respondent argued that Rule 4(e) does not govern
proceedings before the Tax Commission.
14.

(R. 68)

On March 13, 1992, Petitioners filed their reply

memorandum and an amended motion specifically requesting the
Commission to extend the time to file a Petition for

-3100I701C
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Reconsideration pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9).
(R. 40, 44)
15.

On April 15, 1992, the Tax Commission granted

Petitioners' request for an extension of time to file a Petition
for Reconsideration.
16.

On May 4, 1992, Petitioners filed their Petition

for Reconsideration.
17.

(R. 30)

(R. 11)

Respondent did not reply to Petitioners' Petition

for Reconsideration.
18.

On June 3, 1992, the Tax Commission issued its

final order denying the Petition for Reconsideration.
19.

(R. 8)

On July 1, 1992, Petitioners filed a Petition for

Review of Agency Action with this Court.

(R. 2)

ARGUMENTS
I.

PETITIONERS' APPEAL TO THIS COURT WAS TIMELY.

Respondent presents three arguments in support of its
position that Petitioners' appeal was not timely.

First,

Respondent asserts that this appeal is untimely because
Petitioners' did not appeal the Final Decision of the Commission
within thirty (30) days of the date the decision was issued.
Second, Respondent argues that the appeal was untimely because
the Commission's order extending the time to file a Petition for
Reconsideration could not extend the time for judicial appeal.
Third, respondent argues that the appeal is untimely because
Petitioners did not appeal within twenty (20) days after
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submitting their Petition for Reconsideration.

Respondents will

deal with each of these arguments.
A.

The Commission Appropriately Extended The
Time To File A Petition For Reconsideration.

The Utah Code clearly grants to the Tax Commission the
authority to extend the time for filing a Petition for
Reconsideration "for good cause shown."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-

46b-l(9) (1992). Moreover,
an administrative agency should be allowed a
comparatively wide latitude of discretion in
performing its responsibilities [and] courts
should not intrude or interfere therewith
unless the action is so oppressive or
unreasonable that it must be deemed
capricious and arbitrary, or the agency has
in some way acted contrary to law or in
excess of its authority.
Petty v. Utah State Bd. of Regents, 595 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Utah
1979) .
Good cause existed in this case for at least two
reasons.

First, and most importantly, neither Petitioners nor

their counsel received actual notice of the Final Decision until
forty-two (42) days after the decision had been issued.

This

Court has recognized that "due process requires that notice of
the judgment be given to defendant or his right to appeal is
abridged severely."

Hume v. Small Claims Court, 590 P.2d 309,

311 (Utah 1979). * Second, the notice which was purportedly

1

Petitioners thoroughly briefed the constitutional
implications of notice in their Reply Memorandum in Support of
Amended Motion For Relief to Challenge the Final Decision of the
Tax Commission. (R. 51-58)
-51QOVZCOOC i

mailed to Petitioners identified only one of the four
Petitioners and was not mailed to either of the attorneys who
were primarily responsible for the case. Although Respondent
does not specifically challenge the Tax Commission's "good
cause" extension of time for Petitioners to file a Petition for
Reconsideration, it is clear that the extension was
appropriately granted.
B.

The Extension Of Time To File A Petition For
Reconsideration Did Not Lengthen The Time
Period Prescribed In Which To Seek Judicial
Review Of A Final Agency Action.

Respondent incorrectly assumes that the extension of
time granted to Petitioner to file their Petition for
Reconsideration also extended the "time periods established for
judicial review" prohibited by § 63-46b-l(9).

The

Administrative Procedures Act identifies a specific thirty-day
time period for Judicial Review which begins to run at different
periods of time depending upon whether or not a petitioner first
seeks reconsideration from the administrative agency.

Pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(l)(b) (1988) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1988), a petitioner may seek immediate
Judicial Review within thirty days of a final decision and
forego any further agency action.

Alternatively, a petitioner

may, within twenty days of the decision, request the
administrative agency to reconsider its decision pursuant to
section Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(l)(a) (1988).2
2

When a

The Decision of the commission in this case specifically
recognized these alternative avenues of review.
-61QO\1CO*3C 1

petitioner chooses the latter option, the time for filing a
notice of Judicial Review is tolled during the pendency of the
Agency Review.

See, e.g.. Bridger Coal Co./Pac. Minerals. Inc.

v. Director. 927 F.2d 1150, 1152 (10th Cir. 1991) (motion for
reconsideration tolls time for filing notice of appeal); United
Transp. Union v. I. C. C.. 871 F.2d 1114, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(pending petition renders underlying action non-final).
Petitioner may then seek Judicial Review of the initial agency
decision within thirty days of the agency's final order on, or
deemed denial of, the request for reconsideration.

§ 63-46b-

14(3) (a) .
In this case, Petitioners sought and obtained a "good
cause" extension of time to seek Agency Review.3

Section 63-

46b-l(9) expressly allows the Commission the discretion to grant
such an extension of time. Any "good cause" extension of time
to seek Agency Review will inevitably toll the commencement of
the time period for subsequent Judicial Review and section 6346b-l(9) does not prohibit that tolling.

Respondent has cited

no authority to the contrary.
Respondent cites Dusty's. Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n. 842 P.2d 868 (Utah 1992), however, Dusty's has no
application to the issues in this case.

In Dusty's. the

petitioner failed to file any kind of petition for review until
thirty-three days after the date that the Commission's decision
3

It is significant to note that Respondent has never
challenged the "good cause" extension granted by the Tax
Commission.
-7-

was issued.

The petitioner did not seek an extension of time

from the Commission or from the court, but rather, argued that
the thirty-day time period for Judicial Review ran from the date
that the tax decision was received.

This Court held that the

time period ran from the date issued rather than from the date
received.

Id. at 870. Significantly, this Court stated:

"Most

importantly, [the notice] gave Dusty's actual and constructive
notice, and Dusty's ignored that notice at its peril."

Id.

Here, unlike in Dusty's. Petitioners did not receive any notice
of the Commission's Final Decision until after the appeal
periods had run and then acted immediately upon the notice they
received.
The next case relied upon by Respondent is Hase v.
Hase, 775 P.2d 943 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

In Hase, appellant was

issued and received notice of a final judgment but failed to
file an appeal from the judgment within thirty days thereafter.
Appellant asserted that the appeal could be taken from a later
order of the court which merely reiterated the court's earlier
final order.

The court of appeals noted that the district

court's subsequent order could not "be used to extend the time
for appeal because it [did] not resolve any issues extant, but
merely [referred] to prior orders of the court."

Id. at 945.

Respondent erroneously equates the later order in Hase with the
Commission's order on the Petition for Reconsideration in this
case.

Unlike in Hase, the Commission's order resolved an issue

extant--the Petition for Reconsideration.
-81QOV7COOC <*

It is true that the

Commission declined to change its decision, however, Petitioners
had the statutory right to seek such a review pursuant to § 6346b-13(l)(a) and the Commission had the discretion to grant the
extension of time in which to seek the reconsideration.
The appellant in Hase also argued that: an "Objection
to Order" filed fifteen days after the judgment suspended the
finality of the judgment.

The court of appeals first noted that

the objection was not specifically based upon any rule of
procedure.

Id.

The court then treated the objection as a Rule

52(b) motion which had to be filed within 10 days of the
judgment to suspend the finality of the judgment.

Id.

There

was no suggestion in Hase that appellant had grounds for
seeking, had sought or had obtained an extension of time to file
its objection.

In this case, unlike Hase, Petitioners had good

cause for an extension of time to seek Agency Review, sought an
extension of time pursuant to § 63-46b-l(9) and obtained an
extension from the Commission before filing its Petition for
Reconsideration pursuant to § 63-46b-13(l)(a).

Hase is clearly

distinguishable from the facts before this Court.
Respondent also cites Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320
(Utah 1982) and Vanjonora v. Draper, 30 Utah 2d 364, 517 P.2d
1320 (1974).

In each of these cases, the appellant filed an

untimely motion for a new trial. As in Hase, there was no
suggestion that appellants had grounds for seeking, had sought
or had obtained extensions of time from the district courts to

-9100\7CT)C A

file an untimely motion for a new trial.

Therefore, these cases

have no application to this case.
Another case cited by Respondent is Isaacson v.
Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983).

In Isaacson, the issue was

whether mailing of a notice of appeal constituted filing within
the meaning of the statute.

The court held that it did not.

Id. at 851. No similar issue exists in this case and Isaacson
does nothing to further Respondent's contentions.
Finally, Respondent cites three federal cases in which
appellants had filed untimely or deficient rule 59 (e) motions to
alter or amend a decision of the federal district court.

See

Denley v. Shearson/American Exp. Inc., 733 F.2d 39 (6th Cir.
1984) (untimely motion); Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155 (3rd Cir.
1988) (untimely motion); Martinez v. Trainor, 556 F.2d 818 (7th
Cir. 1977) (deficient motion).

In each of these cases, the

courts recognized that although timely and sufficient 59(e)
motions would toll the appellant's time to appeal, untimely
motions would not, and the district courts did not have
discretion to extend the parties' time for filing rule 59(e)
motions.

See Denley, 733 F.2d at 41; Smith, 853 F.2d at 57-58;

Martinez, 556 F.2d at 819-820.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) is similar to a
Petition for Reconsideration in that both vehicles toll the time
for appeal when timely filed.

They differ, however, in that a

district court has no discretion to extend the time for filing a
rule 59(e) motion, whereas, the Commission has the express
-10i o ? \ •*«;:>?*; 1

statutory authority to extend the time to file a Petition for
Reconsideration.

Because of this important distinction, the

federal cases cited by Respondent do not serve as authority for
this case.
Section 63-46b-1(9) simply prohibits the agency from
extending the thirty-day period for Judicial Review.
Petitioners did not seek, nor did the Commission grant, such an
extension.

Within days of learning about the Tax Commission's

January 9, 1992, decision, Petitioners sought an extension of
the twenty-day period for filing a notice of Agency Review.

On

April 15, 1992, the Tax Commission concluded that "good cause"
existed under the facts of this case and granted Petitioners'
request for an extension.

On May 4, 1992, Petitioners filed

their Petition for Reconsideration.

The thirty-day time period

for seeking judicial review was tolled, not extended, until June
3, 1992, when the Tax Commission issued its final order denying
the Petition for Reconsideration.

Petitioners timely filed

their notice of Judicial Review within thirty (30) days of the
written order denying the Petition for Reconsideration.
C.

Petitioners Timely Filed Their Petition For
Judicial Review Of The Final Agency Action
Pursuant To S 63-46b-14(3)(a).

Section 63-46b-14(3)(a) provides:

" A Party shall

file a petition for judicial review of final agency action
within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the
final agency action is issued or is considered to have been
issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b)."
-11-

Utah Code Ann.

§ 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1988) (emphasis added).

The written final

order of the Tax Commission was issued on June 3, 1992.
Pursuant to the express language of § 63-46-14(3)(a),
Petitioners filed their Petition for Review of Agency Action on
July 1, 1992, "30 days after the date that the order
constituting the final agency action [was] issued."

Id.

Respondent argues that Petitioners were required to
file their appeal within thirty days of the twenty day period
set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3)(b) (1988) rather than
from the actual date of the written order.

Section

63-46b-14(3)(a) does not require this result.

The statute

requires a petitioner to file the appeal within thirty days of
the date that the order is issued or from the date that it is
considered to have been issued under § 63-46b-13(3)(b).

It does

not limit the filing of the appeal to the sooner of those two
dates.

Had the Tax Commission failed to issue any written order

on Petitioners Petition for Reconsideration, Petitioners would
have filed their Petition for Agency Review on or before June
23, 1992. However, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b13(3) (a) (1988), the Tax Commission in fact issued a written
final order on June 3, 1992.

Petitioners timely filed their

appeal within thirty days of that written order as required by
the § 63-46b-13(3)(b).

Therefore, Petitioners appeal was timely

filed and this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

-12103X7533*; 1

II.

THE COURT SHOULD GRANT NO DEFERENCE TO THE
DECISION OF THE TAX COMMISSION AND REVIEW THAT
DECISION FOR CORRECTNESS.

This Court should grant Petitioners the relief
requested because they have been "substantially prejudiced" by
the Tax Commission's erroneous interpretation and application of
the law.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1988).

In reviewing

the decision of the Tax Commission, this Court must construe the
facts in favor of the agency's findings.

Hales Sand and Gravel

v. Auditing Div. of the State Tax Comm'n. 842 P„2d 887, 889
(Utah 1992).

However, the Court should "grant no such deference

to the agency's interpretation or application of law," but
rather, review it "for correctness."

Id.

Although Respondent

attempts to color this appeal as a dispute of facts, Petitioners
are not disputing the factual findings of the Commission and
only challenge the Commission's interpretation of the law and
the application of the law to the undisputed facts. Therefore,
this Court must give no deference to the legal conclusions of
the Commission and review them for correctness.

Id.

III. PETITIONERS REASONABLY CONCLUDED THAT THEY WERE A
"GROUP OR COMBINATION ACTING AS A UNIT," AN ISSUE
NOT PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED BY THIS COURT.
As fully discussed in their opening brief, Petitioners
examined the language of the sales and use tax statutes and
reasonably concluded that they were a "group or combination
acting as a unit" for purposes of collecting and paying sales

-13-

Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(1) (1986).l

tax.

As such, they filed

consolidated sales tax returns and did not consider sales tax on
intra-unit transactions.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-5(4) (1986).2

This opinion was shared by the controller who first worked for
Petitioners during and after the reorganization, by the
controller who succeeded to that position and by the independent
auditors who prepared audited financial statements for the
Petitioners.

This Court should follow its practice and construe

the "taxation statutes liberally in favor of the taxpayer,
leaving to the legislature to clarify an intent to be more
restrictive if such intent exists."

Salt Lake County v. State

Tax Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1989).

See also Hales

Sand and Gravel v. Auditing Div. of the State Tax Comm'n, 842
P.2d 887, 890 (Utah 1992) (Court should "construe taxing
statutes in favor of taxpayer and against taxing authority").
In response to this argument, Respondent cites to the
cases of Institutional Laundry, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,
706 P.2d 1066 (Utah 1985) and Hales Sand and Gravel v. Auditing
Div. of the State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 887 (Utah 1992).

These

cases do not govern the outcome of the issues in this case. The
most significant distinction between Respondent's cases and the
appeal before this Court is that the petitioners in

Section 59-15-2(1) is quoted in its entirety in the
Determinative Statutes section of this brief.
2

Section 59-15-5(4) is quoted in its entirety in the
Determinative Statutes section of this brief.
-14io?\-**w; 1

Institutional Laundry and Hase did not reasonably rely upon the
language of the taxing statutes in determining their tax
liability.

More specifically, the petitioners in those cases

did not claim to be "group or combination acting as a unit"
within the meaning of the Sales and Use Tax Act.
In Institutional Laundry, a subsidiary corporation was
created to provide laundry services on an non-profit basis for
the parent corporation.

706 P.2d at 1067. The petitioner

argued that, as a wholly owned subsidiary, Institutional Laundry
had no real separate corporate existence and, therefore was
exempt from tax.

Id.

This Court rejected that argument holding

that the "corporation may not disregard or shed its corporate
clothing to avoid tax consequences."

Id.

Petitioners agree with this proposition.

As a general rule,
Moreover, Petitioners

have not argued and do not argue that they lack separate
corporate identities.

Instead, Petitioners argue that they

consulted the relevant tax statutes and reasonably concluded
that they were a "group or combination acting as a unit" for
purposes of sales tax.

This argument was not asserted or

decided in Institutional Laundry and, therefore, that case
should not govern the outcome of this case.
With respect to the Hales case, it should first be
noted that the main issue before this Court was whether Hales
was obligated to pay tax on its costs to transport gravel
materials to all of its customers.

842 P.2d at 890-894. That

question is not at issue in the instant case.
-15-

The only issue

even remotely related to this case was a claim by Hales that it
did not have to pay taxes on sales to another corporation, JTN,
formed by four of the shareholders of Hales to perform federal
contracts.

Id. at 894-895. As in Institutional Laundry, Hales

claimed that it and JTN were the same entity and did not have to
pay sales tax.

Hales took this position because the Utah

Department of Transportation ("UDOT") had concluded that the two
corporations were a single construction subcontractor for
purposes of federal labor law.3

Id. at 894. This Court

concluded that UDOT's determinations were not binding on the Tax
Commission and that the federal labor law criteria were
inapplicable to the determination of tax liability.

Id. at 894-

95.
The claims and analysis in Hales are clearly different
from the claims and analysis in this case.
claiming to be the same legal entity.

Petitioners are not

Moreover, Petitioners are

not relying upon another agency's determinations of their
status, but instead, upon the Commission's own statutes and
regulations that were reasonably interpreted by Petitioners and
led them to act as they did.

Hales should not govern the

outcome of this case.4

It should be noted that Hales in fact paid sales taxes
on the gravel sales to JTN and sought a reimbursement of those
taxes only after UDOT concluded that the corporations were a
single construction subcontractor. Hales, 842 P.2d at 894.
4

It should also be noted that Respondent has only relied
upon Hales to confront Petitioners' claim that they are a "group
or combination acting as a unit." Respondent has not relied upon
-16io?\^;>?*; 1

Respondent also relies upon the doctrine of "ejusdem
generis" to rebut Petitioners' arguments.

Petitioners do not

disagree with Respondent's analysis of this rule of construction
and are somewhat confused as to why Respondent relies upon the
rule.

Literally, "ejusdem generis" means "of the same class."

Ponderosa One Limited Partnership v. Salt Lake City Suburban
Sanitary District. 738 P.2d 635, 637 (Utah 1987).

The rule is

"designed to save the legislature from spelling out in advance
every contingency in which the statute could apply."

2A Norman

J. Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction
§ 47.17 (5th Ed. 1992).
The best way to understand this doctrine is to see its
operation in a particular case.

In Ponderosa, Salt Lake City

claimed that Ponderosa's action to recover sewer service charges
was barred by a six month statute of limitations covering "all
cases of levy of taxes, licenses, or other demands for public
revenue."

Utah Code Ann. § 59-11-11 (1986).

The court applied

the doctrine of "ejusdem generis" and concluded that, unlike
taxes and licenses which are revenue raising measures, sewer

Hales to rebut Petitioners' second argument concerning the true
ownership of the gravel materials allegedly sold.
This is
probably because Hales supports Petitioners' second argument. The
Hales court recognizes that "passage of title is the moment upon
which the transaction is to be valued for purposes of the tax."
Hales, 842 P.2d at 891. As will be discussed in greater detail,
Petitioners assert that title always remained in Harper
Contracting and therefore, title never passed from Harper
Excavating to Harper Contracting.
Consequently, according to
Hales, since no passage of title ever occurred, no taxable event
occurred.
-17-

charges are payments for services and not of the same class.
Ponderosa, 738 P.2d at 637. Cf. Fields v. Mountain States Tel.
& Tel. Co., 754 P.2d 677, 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (legal
pleadings are not "similar in nature to reports, tax returns and
claims against the state.")
In this case, Petitioners reasonably concluded that
they were a group or combination of corporations acting as a
unit.

As discussed in their opening brief, Petitioners

continued to operate as they had done before the reorganization.
They continued to present themselves to the public as a unit,
typically bid jobs as a unit, were insured as a unit, obtained
bonding as a unit and were dependent upon each other for their
continuing operation.
104-108).

(R. 646; Transcript at 23-25, 34, 56 &

In these respects, they are similar in nature to the

specifically enumerated entities though not technically one of
those entities.5 Therefore, the doctrine of "ejusdem generis"
in fact supports Petitioners' arguments.

Respondent argues that because each petitioner is a
corporation and "person" within the language of the tax statutes
they cannot also be a member of a "group or combination acting as
a unit." This argument is nonsensical. Section 59-15-2(1) states
that partnerships and joint ventures are also "persons" within the
meaning of the sales tax statutes. Partnerships, joint ventures
and associations are frequently comprised of individuals, other
partnerships and corporations.
Respondent cannot argue that
because an individual, partnership or corporation is a "person"
within the tax statutes it cannot also be a member of another
partnership, joint venture or association which is also a "person"
under the statutes, otherwise, the reference to partnerships and
joint ventures in the statute would be meaningless. By the same
token, Petitioners can be separate corporations and still be
members of the "unit" for purposes of sales tax.
-18io?\7«;33i; 1

Finally, Respondent argues that Petitioners' right to
file a consolidated sales tax return is irrelevant to their
sales and use tax liability citing Savage Industries, Inc. v.
State Tax Comm'n. 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991).

Savage has no

application to this case because it deals with the calculation
of income tax and the deduction of net loss carryovers by one
corporation acquiring another corporation under the income tax
statutes.

This case, on the other hand, deals with the

collection and payment of sales tax under the Sales and Use Tax
Act.

The same sales tax statute that requires the vendor/person

to collect and remit sales tax requires that vendor/person to
file a return on a quarterly basis.
(1986).

Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-5(4)

The statute makes no distinction between the

vendor/person for purpose of collecting and remitting the tax
and for purposes of filing the return.
Despite Respondent's contentions, the Commission, in
its prehearing order, implicitly recognized that if Petitioners
were a "group or combination acting as a unit" for one purpose
then they were a "group or combination acting as a unit for the
other."

The Commission's ultimate conclusion in its Final

Decision that "[w]hile the Petitioner may indeed have filed a
consolidated sales tax return, it should have reported
transactions between Harper Excavating and Harper Contracting"
is inconsistent with its prehearing order, is inconsistent with
§ 59-15-5(4), leads to a strained interpretation of that statute
and should not be affirmed.
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IV.

THE COMMISSION MUST IMPOSE SALES TAX BASED UPON
ITS FACTUAL FINDINGS OF OWNERSHIP, NOT UPON
PETITIONERS' ERRONEOUS ACCOUNTING TREATMENT WHICH
FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT OWNERSHIP,

The Commission wrongly stated in its Final Decision
that "the issue before the Commission is whether or not the
manner in which the Petitioner accounted for the transactions
between Harper Excavating and Harper Contracting with regard to
the sale of sand and gravel constituted a taxable transaction."
(R. 210)

The issue is, having found that the underlying

ownership of the property was inconsistent with the accounting
procedures initially followed by the taxpayer, can the
Commission nonetheless impose tax liability based upon that
erroneous accounting treatment which is contrary to the factual
findings.

Respondent fails to recognize that the issue was

purely a legal issue below and remains a purely legal issue on
appeal.

Instead, Respondent attempts to color this issue as a

dispute of facts rather than law.
In its brief, respondent spends several pages
disputing the following factual issues: whether or not the
gravel sales agreements and assignments conveyed a valid
interest in real estate from Rulon Harper to Harper Contracting,
Inc.;6 whether or not the Petitioners' controller erroneously
6

Respondent throws out various theories and arguments to
challenge these agreements and assignments. It argues that the
agreements were not notarized, recorded or contained on the books
of the Petitioners. (Respondent's Brief, p. 25) Moreover, it
argues that the assignment could be invalid under such theories as
novation, subsequent assignment, prior assignment, breach of
contract, lack of consideration, abandonment and mistake.
-201QP\7RP?R 1

assigned the gravel pit materials to Harper Sand and Gravel,
Inc. and; whether or not the transactions that were taxed
involved gravel materials other than those covered by the gravel
sales agreements and assignments.

Contrary to the assertions in

Respondent's brief, the facts are not in dispute.

In fact, the

Final Decision of the Commission sets forth or assumes all of
these facts in Petitioners' favor.

The Final Decision states

that Harper Excavating, Inc. purchased the real estate interests
from Rulon Harper prior to the reorganization, that Harper
Contracting, Inc. succeeded to these real estate interests after
the reorganization, and that Petitioners' controller "mistakenly
assigned those assets to Harper Sand and Gravel."
11 3, 6, 7 & 9)

(R. 208-9,

Moreover, it is clear from the record that both

the parties and the Commission assumed that the gravel materials
at issue in the sales tax determination were covered by the
relevant agreements.

Respondent has not appealed the findings

(Respondent's Brief, pp. 30-31)
Respondent knows that these
personal defenses to the contracts were not considered by the
Commission. In fact, Respondent stipulated to the existence of
these contracts (R. 566-567) and the Commission assumed their
existence and validity (R. 208). Moreover, these same agreements
and assignments govern the current operations of the Petitioners
which have not resulted in sales tax since Petitioners' accounting
procedures were changed. In any event, courts have held, for
obvious reasons, that persons not parties to a contract cannot
claim the parties' personal defenses and collaterally attack that
contract. See, e.g., Barlow v. International Harvester Co., 95
Idaho 881, 522 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1974) (third party could not
assert uncertainty of terms); Jackson v. O'Neill. 181 Kan. 930,
317 P.2d 440, 443 (1957) (third party could not assert lack of
mutuality); Jenks Hatchery, Inc. v. Elliot, 252 Or. 25, 448 P.2d
370, 373 (1968) (third party could not assert statute of frauds).
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of fact of the Commission and it is improper for Respondent to
question these facts in this appeal.
The issue before this Court is not one of fact, but
purely one of law.

That issue is whether or not the initial

accounting treatment applied to a particular transaction should
control the tax liability or whether the factual realities of
the transaction should control.

The Commission concluded that

the "manner in which the Petitioner accounted for the
transactions" creates the tax liability and not necessarily the
underlying facts.

(R. 210)

This cannot be the law.

Tax

liability cannot be predicated on accounting "shams" whether
intentional or inadvertent.

The United States Supreme Court has

specifically recognized the accounting records "are no more than
evidential, being neither indispensable nor conclusive.7 The
[tax] decision must rest upon actual facts."

Doyle v. Mitchell

Bros, Co., 247 U.S. 179, 187 (1918).
Respondent argues that "[t]he tax in this case is not
based on mere paper transactions, but on real, concrete
exchanges of tangible property for consideration between
7

Respondent argues that records are prima facie evidence
of the facts they state. (Respondent's Brief, p. 23) Petitioners
do not dispute this statement and do not fault the auditing
division for its initial conclusion that taxable transactions had
occurred. However, "[p]rima facie evidence does not establish a
presumption; it merely meets the minimum quantum of evidence
necessary for a party to prevail if the evidence remains
unrebutted." Godesky v. Provo City Corp. . 690 P.2d 541, 547 (Utah
1984) . Petitioners only fault respondent and the Commission for
ignoring the realities of ownership and the transactions once they
had been brought to light and the financial statements had been
restated.
-22m i l 7CT5C
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separate corporate entities."
are wrong.

(Respondent's Brief at 24)

They

The facts, as found by the Commission based on

undisputed evidence, are to the contrary.

It wais not the

physical movement of the sand and gravel matericils that created
the tax liability, but only the subsequent accounting treatment
that mischaracterized those transactions.

The fact is that

nothing about the physical processing, movement and placing of
gravel materials has changed between the time prior to the
reorganization and today.

The only thing that has changed is

the paperwork accounting of those transactions.
Since the audit, Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. has
continued to extract, process, wash and stack gravel at the
gravel pits.

(Transcript at p. 117)

Harper Excavating, Inc.

has continued to take the gravel stacked by Harper Sand and
Gravel, Inc. and transport it to particular job sites.
(Transcript at p. 117)

Harper Contracting, Inc. has continued

to take the gravel delivered by Harper Excavating, Inc. and
placed it at the job site.

(Transcript at p. 117)

The only

thing that has changed since the audit is the way these
transactions are accounted for.

Instead of Harper Sand and

Gravel, Inc. paying royalties to the pit owners, they are paid
by Harper Contracting, Inc., the true owner of the gravel sales
agreements.

(Transcript at p. 101)

Instead of Harper Sand and

Gravel, Inc. receiving payments for sales of gravel to Harper
Excavating, Inc., they are paid a fee for processing the
materials for Harper Contracting, Inc.
-23-

(Transcript at p. 117)

Instead of Harper Excavating, Inc. receiving payments for sales
of gravel to Harper Contracting, Inc., Harper Excavating, Inc.
receives a fee for transporting the materials from the pits to
the job site.

(Transcript at p. 117)

Moreover, contrary to

Respondent's assertions, if Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. sells
gravel directly to third persons, it first purchases the gravel
from Harper Contracting, Inc.

(R. 102)

Petitioners' records

and procedures now accurately reflect the true ownership of the
materials rather than the erroneous assumptions of the
controller and these records and procedures have resulted in no
additional sales tax liability.8
It is absolutely imperative that sales taxes reflect
the actual realities of ownership and sale.

Taxpayers cannot by

error or device account for transactions for tax, or other
purposes, in a manner inconsistent with ownership and passage of
title.

In a different context, this Court has recently affirmed

that "passage of title is the moment upon which the transaction
is to be valued for the purposes of the tax."

Hales, 842 P.2d

at 891. Because Harper Contracting, Inc. always owned title to
the gravel materials in this case, no taxable event could have
occurred when Harper Excavating, Inc. physically delivered the
8

Petitioners again note that Respondent has recently
audited their current records and procedures. That audit resulted
in no additional sales tax despite the fact that Harper Sand and
Gravel, Inc. continues to process the pit materials, Harper
Excavating, Inc. continues to transport the materials to the cite
and Harper Contracting, Inc. continues to place the material at
the job sites.
(R. 26). For obvious reasons, Respondent has
chosen not to comment about these later audits.
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gravel from Harpers Sand and Gravel, Inc. to Hairper Contracting,
Inc.

It goes without saying that the Tax Commission would not

honor sham transactions entered into to avoid tax liability.

By

parity of reasoning, the Tax Commission cannot be allowed to
impose taxes when a taxpayer inadvertently uses erroneous
accounting treatment.

For this reason and all of the reasons

stated in Petitioners' initial brief, the Court should reverse
the Commission on this issue and order a refund of those taxes.
CONCLUSION
Petitioners' reasonably concluded that they were a
"group or combination acting as a unit" within the language of
the applicable tax statutes.

The Institutional Laundry and

Hales cases cited by respondent did not address this issue and
do not govern this case.

The doctrine of "ejusdem generis"

supports Petitioners' argument, not Respondent's.

Respondent's

arguments and the Commission's conclusions concerning the
consolidated return are inapposite.

Therefore, the Court should

construe the statutes in Petitioners' favor and reverse the
decision of the Tax Commission on this issue.
The Court should decline to view the second issue in
this case as a factual issue.
disputed.

The facts of this case are not

The Court should reverse the decision of the

Commission because the taxes imposed on Petitioners were based
upon accounting treatment formulated in error that was
inconsistent with the true ownership of the gravel materials as
found by the Commission in its Final Order.
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